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Networks and Collective Action
Abstract
This paper proposes a new measure for a group’s ability to lead society to adopt their
standard of behavior, which in particular takes account of the time the group takes to con-
vince the whole society to adopt their position. This notion of a group’s power to initiate
action is computed as the reciprocal of the resistance against it, which is in turn given by
the expected absorption time of a related finite state partial Markov chain that captures the
social dynamics. The measure is applicable and meaningful in a variety of models where
interaction between agents is formalized through (weighted) binary relations. Using Per-
colation Theory, it is shown that the group power is monotonic as a function of groups of
agents. We also explain the differences between our measure and those discussed in the
literature on Graph Theory, and illustrate all these concerns by a thorough analysis of two
particular cases: the Wolfe Primate Data and the 11S hijackers’ network.
Keywords: Collective action, Social networks, Influence and diffusion models, Network
intervention, Group centrality measures
1 Introduction
Collective action sometimes seems to appear over night, e.g., large protests against a particular
regime suddenly bring onto the streets thousands and thousands of people as happened in the
Arabic Spring in 2011. Given a social network, which individuals or groups of individuals are
able to ignite a chain-reaction and cause collective action on a large scale? Most importantly,
how quickly does the collective behavior arise? What kinds of ties of a network are most im-
portant for collective action and what features are especially relevant? Somewhat analogously,
which individuals in a network should we address if the aim is to prevent action of many when
the action is harmful (as e.g. terrorist activity)? This kind of questions arises in many different
areas, such as sociology and social psychology (e.g. [37], [27], [34]), epidemiology (e.g. [20],
[56]), economics (e.g. [3], [12], [36], [44], [49], [53], [58]), social choice (e.g. [16],[17]), computer
sciences (e.g. [23], [41], [47]) or systems reliability (e.g. [2]), covering the analysis of riot behav-
ior, innovation and rumor diffusion, propaganda, strikes, consumption, network externalities,
spread of fashions, migration, runs on banks, voting power, cascading failures in power sys-
tems, etc.
We select a model to describe how the action profile of a society evolves over time tak-
ing into account several elements that the systemic phenomena of collective behavior have in
common. As posed by the mathematical sociologist Coleman (1990): (i) they involve a large
number of people carrying out the same or similar actions at the same time; (ii) the system
1
is dynamic and might eventually reach an equilibrium state; (iii) there is some kind of syn-
chronization of actions, so individuals do not act independently; and (iv) there is some degree
of unpredictability, sometimes leading to “explosive” results. Then, based on this kind of dy-
namical model, we propose two new indices of group powerwhich carry the spirit of Coleman’s
(1971) power measures, i.e., the power to initiate action and the power to prevent action, respec-
tively. Here, the power to initiate action will be our main focus as the other measure naturally
follows from its definition. The power to initiate action quantifies a group’s ability to trigger
the society to adopt its behavior, and, if at all, how quickly individuals learn this mode of be-
havior. With this information, a social planner, a political party, or a firm’s management may be
able to actively address the most powerful individuals and thus help to prevent or to stimulate
action in a given context.1
It is worth noting that our proposal of group power to initiate action may also be interpreted
as a group centrality measure in the sense of Everett and Borgatti (1999), but its scope is wider
and not restricted to a graph-theoretic context. In addition to allowing asymmetric binary rela-
tions between agents, it also relates the strength of a tie to the time it takes to reach consensus at
the level of society. We will discuss the similarities and differences between graph-theoretical
notions and ours for cases in which comparison makes sense – see Sections 4 and 6.
In order to define a dynamical model of collective action it is crucial to understand the
role of the social structure in the sharing of information and the formation of opinions. We
will assume that the society members are connected through a social network which is the pri-
mary conduit of information, opinions, and behaviors. More precisely, we adopt the interactive
Markov chains (non-symmetric) model, in which an individual’s choice of actions may depend on
arbitrary neighborhoods of others. At each date, agents communicate with their neighbors in
the social network and copy one of their actions from the last period according to a (updated)
probabilistic rule. This approach agrees with the voter model, also called the invasion process,
and first introduced along with their dual process called coalescing random walks in Holley and
Liggett (1975), and also independently in Clifford and Sudbury (1973). Moreover, originally de-
veloped in the context of interacting stochastic processes, the voter model has been considered
as a model of social interaction, as for instance by Asavathiratham (2000) and Even-Dar and
Shapira (2007). Ni, Xie and Liu (2010) also consider an interactive Markov (non-symmetric)
chain based on a monotonic2 modification of the voter model, which they called the incremental
chance model.
Other social dynamics models which are related to our point or view are the following:
• Threshold models of diffusion of innovations, where individuals are assumed to have dif-
1See, e.g., Rogers (1995) on the important role of opinion leaders in the dissemination of information and their
influence on opinions and decisions in various environments likemarketing, social programs, education, campaign-
ing, and others.
2In which it is assumed that once an agent has adopted an innovation he sticks with it.
2
ferent thresholds that determine whether they will adopt an innovation as a function of
the number (or proportion) of others in the population who have already adopted it3.
Kempe, Kleinberg and Tardos (2005) generalize these models by introducing decreasing
cascade models, in which a behavior spreads in a cascading fashion according to a proba-
bilistic rule, beginning with a set of initially active agents, which are the individuals that
have adopted the innovation.
• Interactive Markov chains (symmetric) models, in which the next state of an individual de-
pends on his current state and on the current frequency distribution of the population
among the states modeling the different positions. The dynamics of these models where
first considered by Conlisk (1976), where it was introduced the concept of an interactive
Markov chain as a framework for stochastic flows when the effects on the decisions of in-
dividuals of imitation, fashion, popularity, contagion, and so on cannot be ignored. The
work of Stadje (1997) is a deep generalization of the Conlisk model. However, although
the symmetric case provides insight into broad patterns of social behavior, it does not
incorporate the micro-details of who interacts with whom. To incorporate networked
interactions, a richer non-symmetric structure is needed.
• Opinion formation models, also called social influence network models by Friedkin (2001),
which are models of information transmission, opinion formation, and consensus forma-
tion. Social influence network theory (Friedkin, 1991, 1998, 1999; Friedkin and Johnsen,
1990, 1997, 1999) includes, as special cases, French’s formal theory of social power (French,
1956; Harary, 1959) and the seminal DeGroot’s consensus formation model (DeGroot,
1974; Chatterjee and Seneta, 1977; Berger, 1981). The basic building block of these mod-
els is the fact that network influences are captured by a network effects model, in which
each individual’s attitude is influenced by his exposure, measured as a weighted average
of the attitudes of the other members. Network effects model goes back to Erbing and
Young (1979), with important contributions by Doreian (1982), and specially by Friedkin
and Johnsen (see the previously referenced papers), and more recently by Valente (2005).
In some sense, the dynamical process we adopt is also a network effects model, since
it is based on the notion of exposure. However, whereas all these models describe the
dynamics of opinions and are in fact deterministic, the voter model we have adopted de-
scribes the dynamics of actions4 and it is probabilistic in nature. The implications of this
difference over the power group measures we propose is analyzed in detail in Section 4.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a general pre-
3The dynamics of these models were first studied by Schelling (1971) and Granovetter (1978). For more recent
work, see Valente (1995, 1996), Watts (2002), Dodds and Watts (2005), Lopez-Pintado and Watts (2008), and Young
(2009).
4That is, we calculate a person’s adoption status at each period of time, which is referred to (see Valente, 2010)
as event history analysis (Allison, 1984).
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sentation of the dynamic model we have adopted to describe how the propensity to act in a
society evolves over time; in the description of the model, we will follow the approach of Asa-
vathiratham (2000). In Section 3, based on this model, we propose two indices of group power
(power of a group to initiate action and power to prevent action). Section 4 is devoted to an-
alyze the relation of the group power to initiate action with other centrality measures, while
in Section 5 we prove that group power to initiate full action satisfies a compelling monotonic-
ity property, i.e., if a set of agents is expanded its power to initiate full action will (weakly)
increase. Finally, in Section 6 we apply the proposed measures to analyze some illustrative
examples in detail, namely the behavior of a population of primates and the structure of the hi-
jackers network in the 11S. In particular, we compare our power measure to standard centrality
scores.
2 The model: influence dynamics as a finite Markov chain
Assume that society consists of finitelymanymembers, represented by the setN = {1, 2, . . . , n},
which are connected through a social networkwhose flow of available information is captured,
in some sense, by a weight matrix S. For instance, in a binary symmetric context, S can be the
adjacency matrix of the non-directed graph which models the connection between the agents.
In this case, this matrix is usually referred as the sociomatrix. Nevertheless, in a different de-
sign it can model other features of the network like relational, positional and central proper-
ties through which agents are interlinked. It may as well incorporate exogeneous information
which does not depend on the structure of the network. The reader is referred to Valente (2005,
2010) where a number of different ways of designing the weight matrix are proposed.
Based on the information contained in S, we derive the Influence Matrix, i.e., a stochastic5
matrix W whose elements are understood as influence parameters, wij being the weight that
agent i assigns to agent j. Influence can be asymmetric, as for example if they are one-sided
with wij > 0 while wji = 0. There are many ways to derive the matrix W from S, and usually
the former is defined in terms of some normalization process applied to the latter. As Friedkin
(2010) points out: “different measures of the accorded weights have been employed in the
operationalization (measurement models) of social influence network theory. The theory is
open with respect to the definition of these weights”. We discuss different constructions of the
influence matrix in Section 6.
From now on, assume that S and W are fixed. The influence matrix W defines a (weighted)
directed graph D(W) = (N, E,W) with agents as nodes and arcs (i, j) ∈ N × N: (i, j) ∈ E ⇔
wij > 0, and wij being the weight of arc (i, j). If wij > 0 then j directly influences i, and if there is
5A n× nmatrix Q = (qij)
j
i is stochastic if qij ≥ 0 for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and ∑
n
j=1 qij = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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a directed path P[i, j] from i to j in D(W)6, then j is under indirect influence of i. Note that D(W)
is not necessarily the directed weighted graph which defines the weight matrix S, although the
underlying structure of the graph (not the weights) is usually the same.
2.1 Markov Chain
In our context, the diffusion of information behaves like a stochastic process in discrete time,
which we model through the network effects model approach and, more concretely, the network
exposure models defined by Burt (1987) and Marsden-Friedkin (1993)7. The analysis of diffusion
phenomena in social influence through network exposure, and particularly influence matri-
ces, has attracted much attention because of its extreme flexibility. In the words of Valente,
“Virtually any theoretical mechanism of social influence can be modeled”. This study applies to a
wide range of collective behavior phenomena where agents have a binary choice: to take ac-
tion (being active) or not to take action (remain passive), characteristics indicated by 1 and 0,
respectively. From a dynamic point of view, we assume that the status of the agent may change
as time goes by (see the event history analysis in Allison (1984)). At each date, agents com-
municate with their neighbors in the social network and update their propensity to act. The
updating process is simple: an agent’s new propensity is determined by the weighted average
of his/her neighbors’ actions from the previous period. Then, at each date, the status of each
agent i ∈ N is determined by a probabilistic rule based on his personal network exposure, which
defines the probability of agent i taking action, given the previous decisions of his neighbors.
Formally, consider the following definitions, whereW is the influence matrix.
States of a society: A state of the society (N,W) is a tuple xN ∈ σ(N) := {0, 1}n, xNi ∈ {0, 1}
being the state of agent i, and i = 1, . . . , n, where n is the cardinality of N. Special states are
zN , eN ∈ σ(N), according to which respectively none or everyone in N take action. We will
unambiguously identify xN ∈ σ(N) with a vector in Rn. For xN ∈ σ(N), let A(xN) := {i ∈ N |
xNi = 1} the set of active agents in N.
Influence dynamics: For each society (N,W), let p : σ(N) → [0, 1]n be the mapping defined
by
p(xN) = W · xN , for all xN ∈ σ(N).
Then for each state xN of society (N,W) the number pi(x
N) represents the probability that
i takes action upon observing state xN of (N,W).
6A directed path P[i, j] from i to j in D(W) is a subgraph of (N, E) consisting of a sequence of nodes {i1, . . . , ir},
and arcs (i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (ir−1, ir), where i1 = i and ir = j. Alternatively, we shall sometimes refer to a directed
path as a set of (sequence of) arcs (of nodes) without any explicit mention of the nodes (without explicit mention of
arcs).
7See Valente (2010) for a thorough treatment of this topic.
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Transition probabilities: Now, for xN , yN ∈ σ(N) we define mxNyN as the conditional proba-
bility of state xN turning into state yN , given by
mxNyN := P
{
Xt+1 = y
N |Xt = x
N
}
= ∏
i∈A(yN)
pi
(
xN
)
∏
j∈N\A(yN)
(
1− pj
(
xN
))
,
where XNt = (X
N
1t , . . . ,X
N
nt) is the random vector which describes the state of the society (N,W)
at time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }.
Markov chain: Then,M = {XNt }t≥0 is a discrete time Markov chain with transition matrix M
given by
(
Mij
)
ij
=
(
msNi s
N
j
)
ij
, for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , 2n, where the states are ordered according to
the lexicographical order. Then σ(N) = {sN1 , s
N
2 , . . . , s
N
2n}, and s
N
1 = z
N , sN2n = e
N .
Unlike classical network measures we will not derive our group power measure from S nor
fromW, but from the transition matrixM. This is in sharp contrast to the usual social influence
network models, in which the proposed scores are usually obtained by direct computations
with the weight matrix and/or the influence matrix.
2.2 Preliminaries: Partial Markov chain
Themain goal is to measure the impact on the societywhen themembers of a subsociety T ⊆ N
confine themselves to act. The remaining agents start in a passive state. How long does it
take until the active state of T spreads over to the whole society (collective action) - and will
this always happen eventually? In terms of our dynamic model the question is whether the
associated Markov chain is absorbing and, if it is, to determine the expected absorption time.
In order to address these questions in the following section we need to tailor the preceding
definitions to subsocieties.
The actions of non-members of T are governed by the above defined updating process.
Let sT ∈ σ(T) := {0, 1}t , where t = |T| is the cardinality of T, be the state of subsociety
T ⊆ N that describes the position of agents in T during the whole process, then the social
dynamics of the subsociety N \ T ⊆ N are described by the following partial Markov chain
M(sT) = {X
N\T
t (s
T)}t≥0. Let us first adapt the previous definitions to this scenario.
Notation:. Each combination of sT ∈ σ(T) and xN\T ∈ σ(N\T) defines a state [sT , xN\T] ∈ σ(N)
by
[sT , xN\T]i =
{
sTi , if i ∈ T,
x
N\T
i , if i ∈ N\T.
Influence dynamics on subsocieties: For each subsociety T ⊂ N, and for any given state
sT ∈ σ(T), let ps
T
: σ(N \ T)→ [0, 1]n−t be the mapping defined by
ps
T
(xN\T) = W · [sT , xN\T], for all xN\T ∈ σ(N \ T)
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Transition probabilities: As before, for each state xN\T of subsocietyN \T the number ps
T
i (x
N\T)
represents the probability that i ∈ N \T takes action upon observing state [sT , xN\T] of N. Now,
we define mxN\TyN\T(s
T) as the conditional probability of state xN\T turning into state yN\T,
given by
mxN\TyN\T(s
T) := P
{
Xt+1 = [s
T , yN\T] |Xt = [s
T , xN\T] and XTt+1 = s
T
}
=
= ∏
i∈A(yN\T)
ps
T
i
(
xN\T
)
∏
j∈N\(T∪A(yN\T))
(
1− ps
T
j
(
xN\T
))
.
Partial Markov chain: Then, M(sT) = {X
N\T
t (s
T)}t≥0 is a discrete time Markov chain with
transition matrix M(sT) = (m
s
N\T
i s
N\T
j
(sT))ij, for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , 2
n−t, where the states are la-
beled according to the lexicographical order. Thus, σ(N \ T) = {s
N\T
1 , s
N\T
2 , . . . , s
N\T
2n−t
}, with
s
N\T
1 = z
N\T, s
N\T
2n−t
= eN\T.
3 Power to initiate full action: definition and examples
The properties of the (partial) Markov chain will depend on the particular state sT, and the
particular influence matrix W structure. In order to propose a method to measure T’s power
to initiate (and to prevent) action we focus on two special but natural cases: when agents in T
confine themselves to take action (sT = eT), and the opposite one, when agents in N \ T confine
themselves to never take action (sT = zT).
We will refer to the active subsociety T ⊆ N as the hard core active group in the sense that
they are incapable of change. The chain M(eT ) starts with members outside the hard core
group in a passive state, s
N\T
1 = z
N\T. The resistance of the society to T is then defined as the
expected total time spent in some of the transient states {s
N\T
1 , s
N\T
2 , . . . , s
N\T
2n−t−1
} before reaching
the absorbing state s
N\T
2n−t
= eN\T, if at all.
Definition 1. Given (N,W) and T  N, the resistance of the society to group T action is the number
r(T) ∈ N ∪ {∞} defined by
r(T) := E{t | X
N\T
t (e
T) = eN\T and X
N\T
t−1 (e
T) 6= eN\T}. (1)
For T = N, the resistance of the society to group N action is defined to be r(N) = 0.
In particular, the higher the expected time that a group needs tomove society into the all ac-
tive absorbing state, the higher the resistance against this group. 8 Note that r(T) = ∞ applies
8This definition is extendable to other levels of collective action, say, when a majority of action is the level in
question. Here, the transition matrixM(eT ) can be adjusted by defining states as absorbing in which more than
50% of the society is active.
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when there is a group of agents C ⊆ N\T that is closedwith respect toW, i.e., i ∈ C and wij > 0
implies j ∈ C. Then in this situation (inM)(eT) the state eN\T is not reachable from zN\T. If
there are no closed groups,M(eT) has two classes, namely T = {s
N\T
1 , s
N\T
2 , . . . , s
N\T
2n−t−1
} and
R = {eN\T}, the first class being transient and the second recurrent. Here, the Markov chain
M(eT) is recurrent with an absorbing state, and we can use standard Markov Chain Theory
results to calculate 1 ≤ r(T) < ∞, in particular by means of the fundamental matrix D(eT) for
M(eT). This matrix is given by D(eT) = (I2n−t−1 −Q)
−1, where Q(eT) is obtained from the
transition matrix M(eT) deleting its last row and its last column. The first row of the corre-
sponding fundamental matrix D(eT) gives the expected number of times that the process is in
a transient state if it is started in the transient state s1. In our setting this is the state in which
only the hard core is active. The resistance of the society to group T is therefore computed by
the sum of the first row of the fundamental matrix:
r(T) =
2n−t−1
∑
j=1
d1j(e
T).
Of course, we are aware of the difficulties in tracking the full joint distribution of the Markov
chain M(eT), which is defined by means of a 2n−t × 2n−t transition matrix. However, the re-
sistance to a group can be estimated by means of simulating the behavior of the corresponding
Markov chain. This is precisely the method we propose to deal with our proposal in Section 6.
Finally, we interpret the power of the group T to initiate full action as the inverse of the
resistance against it.
Definition 2. The power of T to initiate full action is defined as the reciprocal of r(T),
P(T) =
{
0, if r(T) = ∞,
1/r(T), if r(T) < ∞.
In analogy to Definition 2, the power to prevent action of group T ⊆ N refers to how quickly
individuals learn to become inactive when the group acts as a hard core passive group (they
remain forever inactive). Therefore, this power is given by the expected time it takes that none
is in an active state, given that all agents in T are passive all the time and the complementary
group starts with a pure action profile. According to our model, then, the positive influence of
every agent to push the remaining agents to take action equals the negative influence of every
agent to push the remaining agents to drop action, and both questions have the same answer:
the potential of actors to ignite a chain-reaction coincides with their potential to act as a firewall.
Remark 1. The absence of closed groups in N\T is equivalent to the property of W that each
agent is directly or indirectly influenced by some agent in T. Another way to put this is in
terms of the corresponding (weighted) directed graph D(W) = (N, E,W). Let us denote by
I(T) ⊆ N\T the set of agents that are directly or indirectly influenced by some agent in T, that
is,
I(T) = {i ∈ N\T | ∃ j ∈ T with P[i, j] in D(W) }.
8
Then, there exists a closed set C ⊆ N\T if, and only if, I(T) $ N\T. Therefore, in particular if
the social structure of the society is described by a strongly connected network (i.e., for all i, j ∈ N
there exists a directed path P[i, j] from i to j in D(W)), r(T) is finite for all T and P(T) > 0.
Wewould like to stress that, apart from the hard core group, we do not consider the dynam-
ics as a one-way process where agents do not leave an active state. This is in crucial distinction
to the traditional innovation literature where – once adopted – individual agents stick with
new innovations. We agree with Young (2003) when he asserts that: ”Yet the same feedback
mechanisms that cause innovations to be adopted also cause them to be abandoned . . . Thus, if
we want to know how long it takes, in expectation, for a ”new” behavior to replace an old one,
we must analyze the balance of forces pushing the adoption process forward (to become active
agents, in our setting) on the one hand, and those pushing it back (to remain passive agents)
on the other”.
Note that in the case of symmetric relations, unless there are separate connected compo-
nents, group T action must eventually dominate for every group ∅ 6= T ⊆ N. However,
it could take “too much time” in practice.9 Moreover, eventual domination of the hard core
group is no longer guaranteed when we consider asymmetric relations. This is illustrated in
the following example.
Example 1. let (N,W) be the society defined by N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and influence matrix
W =

1 0 0 0 0
0.9 0.1 0 0 0
0 0.9 0 0.1 0
0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1
0.9 0 0 0.1 0
 1
5
2
4
31
0.1
0.80.9
0.9
0.1
0.9
0.1
Since C = {1} is closed relative to W, then r(T) = ∞ (and therefore its power to initiate full
action is 0) for all T ⊆ N \ {1}. Otherwise, whenever 1 ∈ T, this effectively influences every
agent in N, so that r(T) is finite and the power of T to initiate full action is positive. One
may calculate r({1}) = 7.4252, r({1, 2}) = 6.8601, r({1, 2, 3}) = 5.8905, r({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 1,
r({1, 2, 4}) = 1, r({1, 2, 3, 5}) = 5, . . .
Now assume the social network changes to the following:
9As Even-Dar and Shapira (2007) point out, to convince society quickly is crucial to the early stages of introduc-
ing a new technology into the market.
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W =

0.8 0 0 0 0.2
0.9 0.1 0 0 0
0 0.9 0 0.1 0
0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1
0.1 0.9 0 0 0
 1
5
2
4
30.8
0.9
0.1
0.8−→
0.2
←−
0.1
0.9
0.1
0.9
0.1
Here, C = {1, 2, 5} is a unique closed group relative to W and, therefore, r(T) = +∞ for all
T ⊆ {3, 4}. ♦
By nature, our idea of society resistance to full action is addressed to understand the dynam-
ics of connected networks10 . However, it may happen that we deal with fragmented societies,
made up of independent subsocieties {(N1,W1), . . . , (Nm,Wm)} that evolve independently. In
this case, it is mandatory that group T has some member of each subsociety in order to be able
to disseminate action across the whole society. At this point, society resistance to group T can
be also defined by (1), or we can adopt an alternative definition and calculate resistance as the
maximum of the resistance of the independent subsocieties. The first option may be adopted if
we are interested in measuring partial action 8 . However, if we are concerned with full action
and we want that the agents in each subsociety do not impose any externality over agents in
the remaining ones, then resistance must be calculated as the maximum resistance, i.e.,
r(T) = max{r(T1), . . . , r(Tm)}, (2)
where r(Tk) is the society resistance to group Tk = T ∩ Nk in the corresponding subsociety
(Nk,Wk), for all k = 1, . . . ,m.
Example 2. Let (N,W) be the society defined by N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and influence matrix
W =

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1
2 0
1
2 0 0
0 0 0 12
1
2
0 0 0 12
1
2

Then, r(T) = ∞ (and therefore its power to initiate full action is 0) for all T ⊆ {1, 2, 3} or
T ⊆ {4, 5}. Otherwise, T can influence every agent in N, and therefore r(T) can be calculated.
For instance: r({1, 4}) = 103 , r({1, 4, 5}) = 3 and r({1, 3, 5}) = 2, when applying definition
(1). However, in this example the society is actually divided into two independent subsocieties
(N1,W1) and (N2,W2), where N1 = {1, 2, 3}, N2 = {4, 5}, and
W1 =
0 1 00 0 1
1
2 0
1
2
 , W2 =
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
,
10We will say that two nodes i and j are connected in D(W) if the graph contains at least one path (not necessarily
directed) from node i to node j.
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that evolve independently. Thus, if we do notwant that agents in T∩N1 impose any externality
over agents in T∩N2, and vice versa, thenwemust calculate r({1, 4}) = max{r1({1}), r2({4})} =
max{3, 2} = 3 < 103 , r({1, 4, 5}) = max{3, 0} = 3 and r({1, 3, 5}) = max{1, 2} = 2. ♦
4 Relation with centrality measures
Recall that our group power measure can also be interpreted as a group centrality measure (Ev-
erett and Borgatti, 1999). The aim of this section is to compare our measure to other centrality
measures. However, note that in contrast to resistance (a) not all standard network central-
ity measures can be used in signed and valued graphs, (b) not all of them can be extended to
groups without invoking the reduced graph approach (Everett and Borgatti, 1999)11 and, finally,
(c) not all of them are appropriate for influence type processes (Borgatti, 2005). Despite these
difficulties, Borgatti (2005) shows that a conceptual comparison can be made by interpreting
centrality measures as characteristics of flows through a network. Using this approach we
conclude that our proposal as individual measure is not comparable, i.e. not proportional, to
Freeman’s closeness or betweenness. Rather, it is more consistent with eigenvalue-like measures.
The canonical representation by Borgatti (2005) shows a characteristic of these measures: they
assume trajectories of flows that can not only be circuitous, but also revisit nodes and lines mul-
tiple times along the way. In order to establish their relationship, the following result due to
Stadje (1997) is crucial, since it allows us to interpret eigenvector-based centrality measures (Katz,
1953; Bonacich, 1972, 1987; and Brin and Page, 1998), and also the total effects centrality defined
in Friedkin (1991), as probabilities of reaching consensus in a stochastic dynamic model based
on the influence matrixW.
If we allow for a set T ⊆ N of initially active nodes to be deactivated during the process, then
we will always work with the general Markov chainM = {XNt }t≥0 which is a recurrent chain
with two absorbing states, namely zN and eN , when the influence matrix W is irreducible. In
that case (see Stadje, 1997), the probability of absorption in eN , given the initial state is [eT , zN\T],
equals
pieN [e
T , zN\T] = ∑
i∈T
ξi,
where (ξi)i∈N is the stationary distribution of the irreducible influence matrix W. If W is not
irreducible, then the society (N,W) is fragmented into independent subsocieties and the prob-
ability of absorption can be calculated as the product of the corresponding absorption proba-
bilities on each of the subsocieties. Therefore, from an individual point of view, eigenvalue-
like measures are closely related to the individual power to initiate action. The eigenvalue of
agent k gives the probability of the new behavior replacing the old one when agent k starts the
11Which replaces all members of a group by a single “super” vertex whose neighborhood is the union of the
neighborhoods of all group members.
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innovative behavior, and taking account that even himself could abandon the new behavior;
whereas his power to initiate action counts the time it takes to convince everybody else to adopt
the innovation when he will never abandon it.12 However, the eigenvalue approach does not
properly generalize to groups since it will result in an additive measure, which oversimplifies
the complex structure of the underlying non-linear network dynamics.
Example 3. Consider a society of four members, where relations are symmetric and binary, and
are described by the following graph, with adjacency matrix A:
4 3
2
1
A =

0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0

In order to derive an influence matrix we modify its diagonal to include each agent’s personal
attitude towards his own opinions. The diagonal elements are indicative for an agent’s inde-
pendence. Suppose that each agent regards his own opinion equally important as that of all
his direct relations (diagonal elements of 1). After normalization we arrive at the following
influence matrix:
W =

1/3 1/3 1/3 0
1/3 1/3 1/3 0
1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
0 0 1/2 1/2

Intuitively, agent 3 should be the most powerful agent, whereas agent 4 should be the least
powerful one. Agents 1 and 2, who occupy a symmetric position in the society, should have an
intermediate strength.
Now, in order to calculate the power of agent 1, the state space of the partial Markov chain
M(e1), σ({2, 3, 4}), will be given by the matrix
σ({2, 3, 4}) =
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 ,
where each column represents a state vector of {2, 3, 4}. In the first state no agent in N \ {1}
is active and the vector We1 indicates each agent’s probability to act in the following period
(apart from 1 who always stays active), in particular p2 = 1/3, p3 = 1/4 and p4 = 0. The
probability for the subsociety {2, 3, 4} to stay in the first state where only 1 is active is hence
12Which fits precisely the terrorist’smovements behavior. There is a hard-core of terrorist that are always pushing
their revolutionary behavior. It is also convenient in those cases in which, for instance, a group of people are paid
for wearing a specific clothing-brand.
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given by (M(e1))11 = (1− p2)(1− p3)(1− p4) = 1/2. The remaining elements of M(e1) are
computed analogously. We get
M(e1) =

1
2 0
1
6 0
1
4 0
1
12 0
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
0 112 0
1
4 0
1
6 0
1
2
1
6 0
1
6 0
1
3 0
1
3 0
1
24
1
24
1
8
1
8
1
12
1
12
1
4
1
4
0 0 0 0 18
1
8
3
8
3
8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

The fundamental matrix of the absorbing system D(e1) = (I7 − Q(e1))
−1 turns to be:
D(e1) ≈

2.779 0.131 0.889 0.201 1.651 0.439 1.681
0.907 1.333 0.645 0.448 0.947 0.479 1.167
0.674 0.204 1.492 0.296 0.944 0.510 1.223
0.203 0.180 0.165 1.452 0.256 0.362 0.376
1.010 0.109 0.708 0.173 2.463 0.418 1.819
0.459 0.143 0.422 0.310 0.677 1.388 1.109
0.294 0.050 0.226 0.096 0.628 0.361 2.185

The expected time it takes until the action of agent 1 has triggered all others is the resistance of
the society to 1 and given by
7
∑
j=1
d(e1)1j ≈ 2.779+ 0.131+ 0.889+ 0.201+ 1.651+ 0.439+ 1.681 = 7.771.
Analogously, all group’s resistances and powers can be obtained. The following table compares
resistance and power to different group centrality measures. The group eigenvalue centrality
is obtained as the corresponding eigenvalue in the group reduced graph. In that case, the
internal structure of the group has no effect. The same occurs when group closeness based
on the minimum method13 and group degree measures are obtained. The group measure we
propose does not show this drawback. Note that group resistance is the only measure that
differentiates between all groups of two agents, up to symmetries of agents 1 and 2, whereas
the remaining measures only distinguish one of them, and moreover, all of them give the same
score for all groups of three agents.
♦
13In which the distance to a group in a graph is defined as the minimumdistance to each of its members. We select
this method, rather than average or maximum group closeness since these are not monotonic measures. Moreover,
our measure is much more related to minimum closeness than to the other two (see the analysis of primate data
example in Section 6).
13
GROUP {1} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4}
RESISTANCE 7.77 4.17 15 5.33 2.3 3.12 3.86 2 1.33 1.5
POWER 0.128 0.240 0.067 0.188 0.435 0.321 0.259 0.500 0.752 0.667
DEGREE 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
EIGENVALUE 0.523 0.612 0.282 0.5 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707
BETWEENNESS 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 – – –
MIN-CLOSENESS 4 3 5 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
DEGREE-NORM. 1.5 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
BET.-NORM. 0 1.5 0 0 2 0 0 – – –
M-CLOSE.-N . 0.75 1 0.6 0.667 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Example 3 group centrality measures.
Whereas centralities like degree and closeness14 are defined by the number of ties between
the agents, their generalizations to signed and valued graphs (see, e.g., Newman (2001), Bran-
des (2008)) mainly focus on tie weights instead. Our approach combines the two views in a
natural way as we will illustrate below. See Opshal et al. (2010), where generalizations combin-
ing both aspects are defined by means of a weighted bi-criteria approach.
Moreover, when applied to non-symmetric relations for these generalizations it is easy to
run into agents with infinite closeness, simply because some are out of reach. This is not a
problem in our context, but it is worthwhile to note that we are dealing with a group measure
and every agent, apart from the isolated ones, is always contained in a group that can actually
reach all of the agents in the complementary group.
Example 4. (Opsahl et al., 2010) Consider a society of five members, where relations are sym-
metric and valued as depicted by the following weighted undirected graph with adjacency
matrix A:
1 2
3
4 5
3
3
3
1
2 2
A =

0 1 2 3 0
1 0 2 0 3
2 2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 3
0 3 0 3 0

Suppose an agent’s self-influence outweighs the average influence by the direct relations, we
14We will not discuss the relation to betweenness measures because the properties of our measure are radically
different.
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may take asW the normalization of A∗:
A∗ =

2 1 2 3 0
1 2 2 0 3
2 2 2 0 0
3 0 0 3 3
0 3 0 3 3
 W =

1
4
1
8
1
4
3
8 0
1
8
1
4
1
4 0
3
8
1
3
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3
0 13 0
1
3
1
3
 .
In this case, the power to initiate action of agents 1 and 2 is close to that of agents 4 and 5, but
greater, reflecting the fact that agents 1 and 2 need less intermediary nodes in their geodesic
paths to the remaining agents than 4 and 5. However, the weighted closeness obtained by
inverting the tie weights (Newman, 2001; Brandes, 2001) stresses the weight dependency by
giving more centrality to agents 4 and 5. ♦
AGENT RESIST. POWER W-CLOSENESS
1 9.5829 0.1043 2.5
3 14.4813 0.069 2.6667
5 9.9126 0.1009 2.1667
Table 2: Calculated power and weighted-closeness for the Opsahl (2010) example.
5 Properties: monotonicity
As non-monotone group power measures should be used with extreme caution, the question
is whether the group measure we have defined is monotonic. We will state first some results
of Percolation Theory, which are the main tool for proving the monotonicity of the resistance,
as well as some notation. We refer the reader to Holley and Liggett (1975) for a thorough
introduction to this topic.
5.1 Percolation Theory
Fix a society (N,W). Given a subsociety S ⊆ N, let us define the weighted directed graph
D(WS) = (N, E,WS), with agents as nodes and arcs (k, j) ∈ N × N, such that wS(k, j) > 0,
where wS(k, j) = wkj, for all k /∈ S and j ∈ N, and wS(k, k) = 1, wS(k, j) = 0, for all k ∈
S and j 6= k. Then, the Markov process M(eS) defined by S can be described in terms of
an associated coalescing random walk (CRW) over D(WS), which is another stochastic process
defined as follows. At time 0, every node holds a black dot. At every time step, the dot on
node i hops to one of its neighbors with the probability given on the arc. All dots are hopping
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simultaneously. When two or more dots land at the same node, they coalesce into one, and
continue hopping.
We will adopt the alternative definition of the CRW process through the outcome matrix,
US = {y
∗ = {(y∗1(t), . . . , y
∗
n(t))}t≥1 | y
∗
i (t) ∈ N, ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ≥ 1},
which describes the social dynamics by means of saying that at each time period, every agent
chooses a neighbor at random with a probability determined by WS, and then copies his/her
status. Note that at each time period, agent i decides who he/she wants to copy with the same
set of probabilities regardless of his/her current status or its neighbors’. Here, y∗i (t) ∈ N is the
neighbor that agent i has decided to copy in period t. For a given outcomematrix y∗, let pik(y
∗)
be the backward path originating from agent i at time k and terminating at some agent at time
0. Let ηik(y
∗) ∈ N be that agent.
Let us assume now that S  N, i0 /∈ S, and denote S′ = S ∪ {i0}, and by TS and TS′ the
random times to reach the revolutionary state eN when the initial states are zN\S and zN\S
′
in
M(eS) andM(eS
′
), respectively. Moreover, let yN\S
′
= {y
N\S′
t }t≥0 be a realization ofM(e
S′)
for which TS′(y
N\S′) = t0 for a certain time t0, and let y∗ be any outcomematrix that reproduces
y = {[y
N\S′
t , 1
S′ ]}t≥0. That is, yit = 0 if ηit(y
∗) /∈ S′, and yit = 1 if ηit(y
∗) ∈ S′, for all agent
i ∈ N, and for all t ≥ 1. Then, the n backward paths pit0(y
∗) of length t0 that reproduce the
adopting patterns from time t = t0 to the initial time t = 0 for every i ∈ N, end at some agent in
S′ (i.e., ηit0(y
∗) ∈ S′, for all i ∈ N). Moreover, t0 is the minimum time satisfying this condition.
Now, let us define the outcome matrix set Y∗ as the matrix composed by all the outcome
matrices y∗ that reproduce y, and let
Y∗(t0) =
⋃
{Y∗ | yN\S
′
with TS′(y
N\S′) ≤ t0},
for each t0 ≥ 1. Then,
P{TS′ ≤ t0} = ∑
y∗∈Y∗(t0)
P{US′ = y
∗} = ∑
y∗∈Y∗(t0)
gS′(y
∗, t(y)), (3)
where
gS′(y
∗, t(y)) = ∏
i/∈S′
∏{wS′(j, k) | (j, k) ∈ pit(y)(y
∗)},
and being t(y) the time it takes the society to reach the revolutionary state when it is evolving
according to y inM(eS
′
). That is, t(y) = TS′(y
N\S′). Note that for every i ∈ S′ (including i0),
and for every instant of time t, y∗i (t) = i.
Now, for any given outcome matrix y∗, we can define the set X∗y∗ whose elements are the
matrices x∗ whose elements are the outcomematrices for the partial Markov chainM(eS) such
that x∗i (t) = y
∗
i (t), for all i 6= i0, for all t ≥ 1. As abstract matrices, the elements of X
∗
y∗ differ
from y∗ only in the i-th row, whose entries can take different values in N.
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For every x∗, we can of course define again:
gS(x
∗, t(x)) = ∏
i/∈S
∏{wS(j, k) | (j, k) ∈ pit(x)(x
∗)},
and the definition of X∗y∗ implies that
gS′(y
∗, t(y)) = ∑
x∗∈X∗
y∗
gS(x
∗, t(x)). (4)
Now we are ready to prove the desired result.
5.2 Proof of the monotonicity
Proposition 1. Let (N,W) be a given society, and let S and T two subsocieties with S ⊆ T. Then
r(T) ≤ r(S).
Proof. Let ∅ 6= S  N be a non-trivial subgroup of agents, and let i0 ∈ N \ S. Then, it is enough
to compare the resistance of the society to S to the one to S ∪ {i0}, and to check that the former
should be, as intuition suggests, greater than the latter. Four cases are possible:
(i) If S ∪ {i0} = N, then r(S) ≥ r(N) = 1, which is the smallest resistance.
(ii) If I(S ∪ {i0})  N \ (S ∪ {i0}) ⇒ I(S)  N \ S, and therefore r(S ∪ {i0}) = r(S) = ∞.
(iii) If I(S ∪ {i0}) = N \ (S ∪ {i0}), but I(S)  N \ S ⇒ r(S ∪ {i0}) < ∞ = r(S).
(iv) Otherwise, S ∪ {i0}  N, 1 ≤ r(S) < ∞, and 1 ≤ r(S ∪ {i0}) < ∞.
For the three first cases the result is clear, so let us analyze (iv) in detail. We will check that
P{TS ≤ t0} ≤ P{TS∪i0 ≤ t0}, ∀ t0 ≥ 1,
so that E(TS) ≥ E(TS∪i0).
The proof is based on the fact that the distribution of TS and TS∪i0 in both Markov chains,
M(eS) andM(eS∪i0), can be analyzed by means of their associated coalescing random walks,
as seen in the previous section. If we adopt the notation introduced there, with S′ = S∪ {i0} in
particular, we observe that X∗y∗ is disjoint from X
∗
y′∗
for every two different realizations y∗ and
y′
∗
ofM(eS
′
), so it follows from (3) and (4), that:
P{TS′ ≤ t0} = ∑
y∗∈Y∗(t0)
gS′(y
∗, t(y)) = ∑
y∗∈Y∗(t0)
∑
x∗∈X∗
y∗
gS(x
∗, t(x)).
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The key point now is that every outcome matrix x∗ ∈ M(eS) such that t(x) ≤ t0 belongs
to exactly one set X∗y∗ , the corresponding to the matrix y
∗ ∈ M(eS
′
) such that for every t ≤ 1,
y∗i0(t) = i0, and y
∗
i (t) = x
∗
i (t). According to the percolation structure, is is easy to realize that
t(y) ≤ t0, and the strict equality holds exactly when t(y) is determined by the copy inM(eS
′
)
of a node in S.
Hence we have the inequality
P{TS ≤ t0} = ∑
x∗∈X∗(t0)
gS(x
∗, t(x)) ≤ ∑
y∗∈Y∗(t0)
∑
x∗∈X∗
y∗
gS(x
∗, t(x)) = P{TS′ ≤ t0}.
Then r(S′) = E(TS′) ≤ E(TS) = r(S), and we are done with this case. Note that the inequality
will be usually strict, as in general not all the elements x∗ of X∗y∗ , for any given y, will be
absorbed in a time smaller than t0 inM(eS).
Note that if we adopt definition (2) to deal with fragmented societies, resistance remains
monotonic. Let (N,W) be a given society that is fragmented into m independent subsocieties
{(N1,W1), . . . , (Nm,Wm)}. Let S and S ∪ {i0} be two groups in N satisfying condition (iv),
and let k(i0) ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be the subsociety which agent i0 belongs to. Then Sk = S ∩ Nk =
(S ∪ {i0}) ∩ Nk = (S ∪ {i0})k, for all k 6= k(i0), and (S ∪ {i0})k(i0) = Sk(i0) ∪ {i0}. Then, taking
into the previous general proof, it follows that
r(S) = max{r(S1), . . . , r(Sk(i0)), . . . , r(Sm)} ≥
≥ max{r(S1), . . . , r(Sk(i0) ∪ {i0}), . . . , r(Sm)} = r(S ∪ {i0})
6 Comparative analysis
In this section we present comparative statistics results concerning the choice of the weight
matrix S and self-influence in particular. We do this by discussing two illustrative examples,
that of Wolfe’s Primate network and the terrorist network 11S. The focus will be on the relation
of the group power measure with standard centrality scores (both individuals and for groups)
and in which sense the former is more general than the latter; the modeling of the self-influence
of an agent; the relationship with the network effects models and specially the wide range of
possibilities allowed in the context of network exposure, and the interpretation as a network
intervention, in the spirit of the key-player problem.
6.1 Self-Influence
The influence matrixW is the basic concept which not only defines relations between different
agents, but also an agent’s independence from his social environment; here the off-diagonal en-
tries serve to summarize the relations between agents whereas the diagonal entries represent
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independence. As illustrated by Example 4, social network data often come encoded as binary
(weighted) symmetric or asymmetric relations, leaving the diagonal entries blank. This im-
plies degrees of freedom in interpreting the respective self-influences. Below, we will describe
three ideas to add the information about self-influence when needed, and perform a sensitivity
analysis of the resistance of the society to each group relative to these choices. As an example,
we will describe the Wolfe’s primate data discussed in Everett and Borgatti (1999), which deals
with binary and weighted symmetric relations.
Let S be the weight matrix, which is the (weighted) adjacency matrix of the (weighted)
undirected graph. We consider the following models for the diagonal:
• Symmetric and independent self-influences: assume the same fixed value for every agent’s
self influence15. We define:
wii = δ ∈ [0, 1), and wij = (1− δ)
sij
∑
n
k=1 sik
, for all i, j. (5)
• Self-influences based on agent’s direct friends: assume that each agent gives to his own opin-
ion the same importance that he gives to his direct friends’ opinion. In that case, we
take:
wii =
si
si + ∑
n
k=1 sik
, and wij = (1− wii)
sij
∑
n
k=1 sik
, for all i, j, (6)
where si is the average influence that his direct friends exert over agent i, i.e., si =
∑j 6=i sij
δ(i) ,
δ(i) being the degree of node i in the corresponding undirected (weighted) graph defined
by S. See Example 3 for an application of this choice to a binary undirected graph, and
Example 4 for its application to a weighted undirected graph.
• Self-influences based on agent’s centrality in the social network: following Friedkin (2001), we
will assume that the structuralmeasure of an agent’s susceptibility to influence, measured
by 1− wii, is based on the agent’s centrality in the social network. Moreover, similar to
that paper, we draw on themost elementarymeasure of centrality, the degree of the agent.
Hence we write:
wii = 1−
√
1−
1
1+ e−(δ(i)−2δ)
, and wij = (1− wii)
sij
∑
n
k=1 sik
, for all i, j, (7)
where δ is the average degree of the agents, when relations are symmetric and binary.
6.2 Wolfe Primate data: Self-Influence Sensitivity Analysis andRelationwith group
centrality measures
In the sequel we undertake the analysis of the Wolfe primate data, which are given as a stan-
dard dataset in UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002). The data represent threemonths
15Since we do not have exogenous information to attach different values to different primates. We propose several
asymmetric actions later.
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of interactions between a troop of monkeys, observed in the wild by Linda Wolfe as they
sported by a river in Ocala, Florida. Joint presence at the river was coded as an interaction
and these were summed within all pairs. The dataset also contains information about the sex
and age of each animal. Everett and Borgatti (1999) consider six different groups to illustrate
their group centrality proposals. Four of the groups were formed by age, and two formed by
sex: (1) Age 14-16 (1,6,11,13,19); (2) Age 10-13 (2,3,8,12,16); (3) Age 7-9 (4,5,9,10,15,17); (4) Age
4-5 (7,14,18,20); (5) Male (1 to 5); and (6) Female (6 to 20). They dichotomized the data, formerly
symmetric and valued, by taking the presence of a tie if there were more than six interactions
over the time period (see Figure 1). We will analyze the binary case to develop a comparative
analysis, but also describe the valued case, to which our proposal can be properly applied.
As in [24], when dealing with the binary case, we have permanently deleted the isolate nodes
2,6,16,18,19 and 20.
Figure 1: Wolfe Primate binary social network
Table 3 shows the group centrality scores for the six groups, as well as the resistance of
the society to each one under the different scenarios we have considered: symmetric and inde-
pendent self-influences (denoted by Rdelta), with self-influence values from δ = 0 to δ = 0.9;
self-influences based on agent’s direct friends (denoted by Rmean), and self-influences based on
agent’s centrality in the social network (Rdegree). Note that it is possible to replace δ(i) by a
parameter incorporating other aspects of autonomy as e.g. the relative time each primate does
not encounter other primates or ethnologic knowledge to differentiate autonomy attitude ac-
cording to, for example, age. However, this would require additional information.
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Closeness Fixed self-influences
Group Degree Min. Average Max. Between. R0 R0.2 R0.4 R0.75 R0.9 Rmean Rdegree
Age 14-16 8 14 18 20 2.84 10.82 10.82 10.82 33.94 84.90 11.36 20.00
Age 10-13 11 11 15 21 43.5 4.50 5.63 5.63 18.82 47.83 5.76 4.56
Age 7-9 5 11 13.7 15 0 7.27 8.85 8.85 27.63 68.99 8.85 16.04
Age 4-5 5 19 20.5 22 0 15.58 18.57 18.57 56.07 139.14 19.25 31.33
Male 10 10 16 20 24.34 6.11 7.51 7.51 23.93 60.11 7.52 6.62
Female 4 4 6.4 7 0.5 2.16 2.88 2.88 10.30 26.36 2.96 9.39
Table 3: Group centrality and the resistance of the society for the Primate data. Absolute values.
Closeness Fixed self-influences
Group Degree Min. Average Max. Between. R0 R0.2 R0.4 R0.75 R0.9 Rmean Rdegree
Age 14-16 0.53 0.79 0.61 0.55 0.03 0.98 0.98 1.30 3.09 7.72 1.03 1.82
Age 10-13 0.73 1 0.73 0.52 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.69 1.71 4.35 0.52 0.41
Age 7-9 0.36 0.73 0.58 0.53 0 0.91 1.11 1.45 3.45 8.62 1.11 2.01
Age 4-5 0.31 0.63 0.59 0.55 0 1.30 1.55 2.00 4.67 11.60 1.60 2.61
Male 0.67 1 0.63 0.5 0.23 0.61 0.75 0.99 2.39 6.01 0.75 0.66
Female 0.8 1 0.63 0.57 0.05 0.54 0.72 1.00 2.57 6.59 0.74 2.35
Table 4: Group centrality and the resistance of the society for the Primate data. Normalized
values.
Group closeness depends on the definition of distance from the group to an outside node.
Everett and Borgatti (1999) considered (i) the minimum distance to each of the group’s nodes;
(ii) the average of the distances; and (iii) the maximum distance.
Table 4 gives the corresponding normalized values (see [24]), which have greater signif-
icance in this context since we compare groups of different sizes. Here, resistance has been
divided by the number of non-group members. This value can be interpreted as the average
expected time to convince a non-group agent to become active.
All group measures but group closeness with the maximum method rank groups of Male,
Female and Age 10-13 primates as the three best ones. Moreover, comparing group closeness
(with the minimum and average method), degree and resistance results, we see a broad agree-
ment between the measures. However, there are some interesting aspects in favor of resistance
that should be remarked. With respect to the relation between closeness and resistance, first
note that minimum and average closeness does not provide much sensitivity. All the three
aforementioned groups attain the maximal value with the minimum method, whereas the av-
erage method does not differentiate among Male and Female groups. This is not the case with
resistance. Given a group in active mode, which features of the network are relevant in order
to achieve full action as soon as possible? Resistance indicates a change in the relative ordering
among Male and Female groups with respect to different self-influence choices. When agents
are very sensitive to influence, see R0, R0.2 and Rmean (which is in between) results, the Fe-
male group is more powerful than the Male group. Note that the Male group contains primate
3, who is related with all female primates. With decreasing independence he is more easily
convinced, and reciprocally he becomes harder to convince with increasing independence (δ).
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Note also that the relative largest difference among these two groups is obtained for Rdegree
(self-influences based on agent’s centrality in the social network). In that case primate 3 be-
comes very hard to convince (with w33 = 0.875), and therefore the resistance of the society to
the Female group rises drastically. Moreover, note that the Female group is considerably larger
in size (15) than the Males (5). This advantage, however, decreases as male primates become
less sensitive to influence. To sum up, for small values of δ the Female group is more powerful
than the Male group, which reproduces group degree and closeness relative order; whereas for
bigger values of δ theMale group is more powerful reflecting the relative order of betweenness.
Obviously agents are harder to influence with increasing δ, and therefore the resistance of
the society to every group increases. Analyzing those increments, we observe that the marginal
effects of increasing δ over resistance are bigger as δ approaches to one, and also are bigger for
less powerful groups than they are for more powerful ones.
The analysis so far was based on dichotomous data (by taking the presence of a tie to be
more than six interactions over the time period). We will now analyze the valued case. When
the number of interactions over the three months time period is taken into account, we obtain
a weighted undirected connected graph without isolated nodes. Table 5 shows the resistance
of the society to each of the considered groups and indicates a change in the ranking of a
group’s power to initiate action. In contrast to the dichotomous model, the primates’ group
of ages ranging from 10 to 13 is not among the most powerful, and is ranked fourth in almost
all scenarios. The Female group is now the most powerful group for all scenarios, except in
the extreme cases in which all primates are very independent, with self-influence values of
δ = 0.75 and δ = 0.9. Here, as before, the advantage of larger group size decreases as male
primates become less sensitive to influence, and Female group’s power falls from rank one to
the third position for δ = 0.75, and even to the fourth for δ = 0.9.
Let us consider next self-influences based on agent’s centrality in the social network. Re-
placing degree on (7) by weighted degree, the self-influences we obtain are zero for all primates
but primate 3, whose high level of independence prevents this effect (with w33 = 0.9992). As
a result, society resistance’s to all groups not containing primate 3 increases considerably, the
resistance to the Female group above all. If we obtain the self-influences through the degree16,
the Female group remains as the most powerful group, but the Male group loses some of its
power favoring the Age 7-9 group.
6.3 Selecting the Weight Matrix
In the previous example we analyzed the correlation of resistancewith somewell-known group
centrality measures. Moreover, according to different criteria, we proposed different choices of
16Then we must consider the difference δ(i)− δ, instead of δ(i)− 2δ, which turns all monkeys totally sensitive to
influence (wii = 0, for all i).
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Fixed self-influences
Group R0 R0.2 R0.4 R0.75 R0.9 Rmean Rw−degree Rdegree
Age 14-16 0.61 0.75 0.98 2.34 5.85 0.64 105.82 14.42
Age 10-13 0.55 0.68 0.89 2.14 5.37 0.58 0.55 12.94
Age 7-9 0.51 0.64 0.85 2.05 5.17 0.54 107.28 11.32
Age 4-5 0.80 0.97 1.26 2.95 7.32 0.84 114.34 19.32
Male 0.51 0.63 0.84 2.03 5.09 0.54 0.51 12.32
Female 0.41 0.57 0.81 2.11 5.43 0.45 249.76 3.92
Table 5: Normalized group centrality and the resistance of the society for the valued Primate
data.
the diagonal of the weight matrix, and explored the consequences of the respective definitions.
This subsection shows how to take a somewhat deeper profit of the freedom in the choice of
this matrix by adding information which not depend directly, as in the classical (symmetric)
case, on the the number of incident edges in each vertex. In the spirit of the network exposure
models, and according to the recommendations of Valente (see comments on Section 2 about
this point), wewill consider different weightmatrices to derive the influencematrix conducting
the dynamical process. As a result, computing the resistance of the society to each group in each
of the considered scenarios provides different group power measures which are not only based
on individual direct relations, but also include information derived from the total network
structure. Moreover, this approach allows to introduce exogeneous information which does
not depend on the structure of the network.
The forthcoming subsection applies these ideas to the terrorist network of the 11S, which
deals with binary symmetric relations. We will now describe the different influence matrices
to be considered. Assume the underlying graph is connected, and consider first the following
symmetric sociomatrices:
• The matrix S(1) is the adjacency matrix of the graph.
• The matrix S(2) is obtained by inverting the entries dij of the distance matrix D, for i 6= j.
Recall that the entry dij of this matrix is the geodesic distance between the node i and the
node j. For every i, we define S(2)ii = 0.
• The matrix S(3) is obtained squaring the entries of S(2).
• The matrix S(4) emerges from S(3) by setting all entries with aij < 1/9 equal to zero.
• If the elements of the matrix G = {g}ij count the number of geodesical paths between
each pair of nodes i and j, we define S(5) as the matrix of pondered geodesical paths,
whose entries are S(5)ij = gij/dij, if i 6= j, and zero otherwise.
The matrices S(2), S(3), S(4) and S(5) take the distance between nodes into account. In S(3)
the influence of the distance is weakened in comparison to S(2). In S(4) we do not consider
any relation between nodes which are separated by a distance bigger than three, while in S(5)
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the influence of distance is weighted by the number of geodesic paths connecting the nodes. It
is easy to imagine similar versions of these matrices.
Finally, we consider two different kinds of non-symmetricmatrices:
• Assume that there exists a directed valued graph with more relational information be-
tween the agents in the social network, and call E the weight matrix. Define S(6) such
that S(6)ij = S(1)ij + Eij, for every i 6= j, and zero otherwise. In an analogous way, S(7)
is defined as S(7)ij = S(6)ij if S(1)ij 6= 0, and zero otherwise. Here, S(6) always takes
account of the weights. For S(7) this is only the case when there is an edge joining the
corresponding nodes in the original relational graph.
• Let C be any individual centrality measure, and let Ci be agent i’s centrality. Then S(k),
for k = 8, 9, 10, are matrices obtained when the influence of agent i over the remaining
agents is weighted according to its centrality score. In that case, S(k)ij = CjS(1)ij, for
all i, j. For k = 8, 9, 10, C will be respectively the normalized degree, the normalized
closeness or the normalized betweenness.
The above definitions represent different versions of the weight matrix, up to fixing the
own individual level of independence (i.e., up to fixing the diagonal of the S(·) matrices). In
this analysis, we have assigned a certain proportional weight to the influence that an agent
exerts to itself. As we explained in the previous section, this is not the only possible choice
for the elements of the diagonal; however, it is quite reasonable from the point of view of
the dynamical model we adopt, as it assumes that the number of times an agent adopts his
own previous action is an average of the number of times he adopts the action of those agents
influencing him. Now, we must derive the influence matrices in a reasonable way from the
defined sociomatrices. As we want to preserve the information as far as possible, we derive
the influence matrixW by means of a normalization process. In particular, if S is a matrix n× n,
then, according to (6), we define:
wij =
s˜ij
∑
n
k=1 s˜ik
, for all i, j,
where s˜ij = sij, for all i 6= j, sii =
∑j 6=i sij
δ+(i)
, and being δ+(i) the out-degree of node i in the
corresponding (directed) weighted graph defined by S.
We will describe the implications of the different choices of these matrices in the next ex-
ample.
6.4 The 11S network
In the sequel we undertake an analysis of the terrorist network of the 11S. Our starting point
is the version of the network in Figure 2, whose links come from terrorist that lived or learned
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together (black edges) as well as some temporary links that were only activated just before the
attack in order to coordinate the cells. See Krebs (2002) for further information.
Figure 2: 11S social network
We constructed the weight matrices derived from that graph and the corresponding influ-
ence matrices according to the definitions above.17 Note that the mere structure of the network
allows to construct all the matrices except for the cases S(6) and S(7) (see below), which re-
quire exogenous information in order to construct a valued graph. We have introduced extra
information corresponding to other discovered contacts between the hijackers, as for example
registration in the same hotels, renting the same car or share the same gym. As a result, the
value on an edge increases with reported contacts between the hijackers defining it. For each
choice, we have computed the resistance of the societys to each individual terrorist and de-
scribed the most influential group. The numerical method is an estimation of a group’s power
to initiate full action by means of stochastic simulation, and we adopt a natural greedy algo-
rithm to identify the 4-members18 leader group. The idea is to begin with the terrorist with
the smallest resistance, and proceed with an induction: given a group S of terrorists, select the
terrorist {i} who produces the biggest reduction in the resistance of the society when added to
17The dataset is available on request.
18As it is well known, the nineteen hijackers which prepared and executed the attack were distributed in four
cells, one for each plane that they planned to crash. Flight AA#11, crashed into WTC North, in green colour; Flight
AA#77, crashed into Pentagon, in red; Flight UA#11, crashed in Pennsylvania, in blue; and Flight UA#173, crashed
into WTC South, in pink.
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Hard core S(1) S(2) S(3) S(4) S(5) S(6) S(7) S(8) S(9) S(10)
1st to enter Al-Shehhi N. Al-Hazmi N. Al-Hazmi N. Al-Hazmi Al-Shehhi Atta Atta N. Al-Hazmi N. Al-Hazmi Atta
2nd to enter N. Al-Hazmi Al-Shehhi Al-Shehhi Al-Shehhi Jarrah N. Al-Hazmi Al-Shehhi Al-Shehri Al-Omari Al-Omari
3rd to enter Al-Shehri H. Al-Ghamdi H. Al-Ghamdi Atta Hanjour Al-Shehri H. Al-Ghamdi Al-Shehhi Al-Shehhi N. Al-Hazmi
4th to enter H. Al-Ghamdi Jarrah Al-Shehri H. Al-Ghamdi Al-Haznawi H. Al-Ghamdi Hanjour H. Al-Ghamdi W. Al-Shahri Al-Shehhi
Table 6: Determining the hard core
group S. We will refer to the sequentially selected terrorists as “the hard core”. The results of
the greedy algorithm are depicted in Table 6. In Table 7, in turn, we show the resistances to ev-
ery individual agent, as well as the individual degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvalue
scores. Here, all centrality computations have been undertaken systematically with UCINET
(Borgatti et al., 2002).
Let us comment briefly the results. Themost repeated components of the hard core are Mar-
wan Al-Shehhi, Nawaf Al-Hazmi, Mohamed Atta, Waleed Al-Shehri and Hamza Al-Ghamdi,
and hence all the cells are represented in this group. When running the algorithm, the first
three mentioned hijackers appeared frequently in the first or second iteration, which is not sur-
prising as Atta an al-Shehhi were reported to be leaders of the network, and Al-Hazmi had
contact with members of all the cells. Al-Shehri and Al-Ghamdi represent the unique tie of
some individuals to the rest of the network. Consequently, their presence in the hard core is
necessary in order to allow the information to diffuse to these individuals; in fact, these are the
only two nodes whose absence would disconnect the graph.
Observe that the resistances to Atta and Al-Shehhi are always very low and similar. Except
in one case, the resistance to Al-Shehhi is a little bit smaller than that to Atta in the cases where
the influence matrix depends exclusively on the distances of the graph, and this fact suggests a
certain structural advantage of the position of the former. Notice that this advantage cannot be
concluded from its closeness nor its betweeness, and in fact Atta becomes the main character
when in S(10) we introduce the betweenness in the model. This happens again when we
consider the exogenous information through models S(6) and S(7). It is also remarkable that,
except in one instance, Atta appearing in the hard core causes Al-Shehhi to not appear, and
viceversa. From this point of view the two terrorists share a great part of the influence.
Let us also comment some differences between the considered scenarios. We have al-
ready described how the weights drastically change the “leader” of the hard core. For S(1)
to S(5), the weight matrices depend on the distance between nodes. In S(1) and S(3) only
very short distances count, such that the hard core “requires” the presence of Waleed Al-Shehri
and Hamza Al-Ghamdi in order to reach the outskirts. On the other hand, in S(2) and S(4),
one of these is replaced by a more central node, namely Jarrah and Atta, as the time needed
to arrive to the more distant nodes is smaller. Another very different point of view is given by
S(5), where at least three of the hijackers score very high in degree and closeness in the selected
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S(1) S(2) S(3) S(4) S(5) S(6) S(7) S(8) S(9) S(10) Eig. Deg. Clos. Betw.
Mohamed Atta 43.568 30.163 28.745 27.935 31.843 53.693 32.731 48.330 32.309 14.061 0.361 0.263 0.068 0.119
Marwan Al-Shehhi 41.009 30.093 28.950 28.482 26.660 56.269 35.446 54.316 32.345 18.380 0.348 0.316 0.064 0.116
Said Jarrah 47.592 31.383 31.819 30.569 28.883 66.288 55.408 58.509 36.626 44.471 0.334 0.263 0.061 0.116
Khalid Al-Midhar 84.143 37.228 49.715 37.319 34.464 188.968 64.595 148.686 72.299 ∞ 0.173 0.105 0.051 0
Nawaf al-Hazmi 42.292 28.523 26.817 27.299 27.648 65.532 47.846 26.106 30.632 20.977 0.405 0.368 0.068 0.170
Abdulaziz Al-Omari 67.935 34.861 37.723 33.694 34.639 73.380 55.680 131.587 60.879 20.446 0.166 0.158 0.057 0.163
Waleed Al-Shehri 145.999 40.733 52.911 53.511 41.146 148.241 50.755 465.507 171.035 43.720 0.042 0.158 0.043 0.116
Wail Al-Shehri 201.605 49.194 67.583 88.248 49.823 184.932 52.427 822.615 301.641 ∞ 0.012 0.105 0.033 0
Majed Moqed 140.545 42.642 54.129 46.168 42.103 167.989 69.717 558.813 139.393 ∞ 0.083 0.053 0.044 0
Salem Al-Hazmi 62.853 33.936 34.749 33.134 32.655 109.774 57.885 87.155 49.717 194.906 0.241 0.158 0.058 0.008
Hami Hanjour 47.487 29.909 27.296 29.115 29.955 83.160 40.527 45.770 34.818 21.272 0.377 0.316 0.064 0.093
Ahmed Al-Haznawi 69.093 35.102 36.438 35.167 33.291 123.460 101.784 96.478 61.788 208.518 0.181 0.158 0.053 0.016
Satam Suqami 201.537 49.227 67.570 88.199 49.821 206.315 78.924 824.928 302.793 ∞ 0.012 0.105 0.033 0
Said Al-Ghamdi 64.864 33.702 33.625 33.788 37.118 143.069 78.350 41.136 55.330 300.037 0.230 0.211 0.054 0.006
Ahmed Al-Hami 72.898 35.660 37.492 35.795 35.027 155.917 90.238 29.623 64.174 ∞ 0.197 0.158 0.052 0
Fayed Ahmed 94.547 37.803 42.973 37.081 40.009 232.706 110.031 249.070 89.764 137.727 0.094 0.105 0.052 0.029
Mohand Al-Shahri 98.647 38.891 44.349 40.353 40.027 194.741 113.224 235.037 100.057 216.080 0.077 0.105 0.047 0.019
Hamza Al-Ghamdi 57.261 30.866 28.857 30.961 33.570 121.461 71.769 35.593 48.432 43.060 0.253 0.316 0.058 0.104
Ahmed Al-Ghamdi 148.728 43.749 55.943 48.911 46.906 327.979 131.802 543.072 169.172 ∞ 0.056 0.053 0.041 0
Table 7: Individual resistances and centralities
hard core. This is not surprising, as this weight matrix counts the number of geodesic paths. It
neither comes as a surprise that the values of betweenness are lower: if there are a lot of edges
“around” the hard core, there will always be alternative paths if a node is erased.
It is also interesting to observe that Al-Omari appears in the hard core only for two of the
measures that integrate in the model the individual centralities of the hijackers. In other words,
the relevance of this node is only perceived by these particular versions of the weight matrix,
as it happens with Atta for S(6), S(7) and S(10). From this facts it can be concluded that the
flexibility of the model allows to identify leadership which does not follow straight from the
graph structure.
This present approach allows to explore different features of the network in an unified way.
Conversely, next to the differences, one may also wonder about the similarities of the results
obtained according to the different models. After all, they are constructed following the same
basic scheme. In order to address this question we have computed the correlations between the
resistances (Table 8). Looking at them as individual measures of power, all of them that depend
on the distance -including closeness- are highly correlated, and the values of the correlations
descend drastically when we deal with S(6), S(7) and S(10). This is consistent with the fact
that we are introducing exogenous information, in the first two cases, and the independence of
betweenness and distance, in the latter.
For obvious reasons one has to be careful with these correlations. Firstly, the small sample
size affects their reliability, and secondly, the correlations do not take account for the fact that
we are interested in relative power instead of the actual values of the measure. These orders
show certain variations for the different measures (Table 9), which imply in turn significa-
tive changes in the outcomes of the greedy algorithm. Nevertheless, taking account of these
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S(1) S(2) S(3) S(4) S(5) S(6) S(7) S(8) S(9) S(10) Eig. Deg. Clos.
S(1)
S(2) 0.981
S(3) 0.975 0.987
S(4) 0.946 0.916 0.908
S(5) 0.954 0.961 0.929 0.871
S(6) 0.693 0.747 0.727 0.516 0.801
S(7) 0.302 0.403 0.331 0.134 0.481 0.799
S(8) 0.983 0.952 0.950 0.937 0.916 0.624 0.215
S(9) 0.981 0.950 0.942 0.988 0.919 0.602 0.211 0.973
S(10) 0.679 0.718 0.743 0.624 0.640 0.618 0.270 0.651 0.641
Eig. −0.882 −0.927 −0.903 −0.756 −0.919 −0.790 −0.563 −0.815 −0.813 −0.554
Deg. −0.716 −0.822 −0.803 −0.549 −0.786 −0.786 −0.614 −0.658 −0.610 −0.623 0.888
Clos. −0.954 −0.978 −0.960 −0.878 −0.949 −0.776 −0.479 −0.896 −0.913 −0.694 0.952 0.820
Bet. −0.478 −0.587 −0.546 −0.420 −0.550 −0.665 −0.587 −0.409 −0.422 −0.603 0.550 0.708 0.629
Table 8: Correlations between individual resistances and centralities
subtleties, we observe in Table 6 similarities of hard cores. The explanation is that measures
S(1)-S(4) are based on distance, S(6) and S(7) rest upon the same weights, and the last three
are constructed in a similar way taking account of the individual centralities. Same features of
the network are likely to produce similarities, although, as illustrated by S(1) and S(2), this is
not always the case.
As discussed in the previous section, however, the main focus of resistance is not individual
power, but diffusion time and group influence. There we showed that the relation between the
resistance of the society to groups and group centrality measures is not closed. The fact that
the models produce different hard cores therefore does not come as a surprise.
It is also interesting to compare our results with those obtained from different versions of
the key player algorithm of Borgatti (2006). Similar to our approach, this algorithm aims at
identifying an influential group, but unlike the resistance it focuses on the maximally con-
nected set of nodes (KPP-positive) or on the group of nodes whose deletion would cause a
major disruption (KPP-negative). The results of the application of the algorithm to some rel-
evant examples of the earlier defined influence matrices are depicted in table 10. There is a
significant similarity in the selected members of the core (3 out of 4), although for the two dif-
ferent versions of the algorithm the members are not the same. In any case, this is remarkable
because the key player power is usually highly related with betweenness, while the individual
resistance is in all versions correlated to closeness (see Table 8) but not to betweenness: in par-
ticular, the correlation between resistance and betweenness is −0.478, a non-meaningful value.
Theoretically, small values of betweenness may be compatible with small values of the resis-
tance of the society. This is the case if for some node there is a small distance to any other node
in the network, but every path that passes through the node can be avoided using another.
This suggests that the above coincidences may not be general, but merely a consequence of the
small diameter of the network combined with high connectivity.
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S(1) S(2) S(3) S(4) S(5) S(6) S(7) S(8) S(9) S(10) Eig. Deg. Clos. Betw.
Mohamed Atta 3 4 3 2 5 1 1 6 2 1 17 15 18 17
Marwan Al-Shehhi 1 3 5 3 1 2 2 7 3 2 16 17 16 16
Said Jarrah 5 6 6 5 3 4 7 8 5 8 15 14 15 12
Khalid Al-Midhar 12 12 14 13 9 15 10 12 12 15 9 7 7 1
Nawaf al-Hazmi 2 1 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 4 19 19 19 19
Abdulaziz Al-Omari 9 9 11 8 10 5 8 11 9 3 8 9 12 18
Waleed Al-Shehri 16 15 15 17 15 11 5 15 17 7 3 8 4 15
Wail Al-Shehri 19 18 19 19 19 14 6 18 18 18 2 4 2 2
Majed Moqed 15 16 16 15 16 13 11 17 15 16 6 2 5 3
Salem Al-Hazmi 7 8 8 7 6 7 9 9 7 10 13 12 13 8
Hami Hanjour 4 2 2 4 4 6 3 5 4 5 18 18 17 13
Ahmed Al-Haznawi 10 10 9 10 7 9 16 10 10 11 10 10 10 9
Satam Suqami 18 19 18 18 18 17 14 19 19 19 1 3 1 4
Said Al-Ghamdi 8 7 7 9 12 10 13 4 8 13 12 13 11 7
Ahmed Al-Hami 11 11 10 11 11 12 15 2 11 14 11 11 9 5
Fayed Ahmed 13 13 12 12 13 18 17 14 13 9 7 6 8 11
Mohand Al-Shahri 14 14 13 14 16 18 18 13 14 12 5 5 6 10
Hamza Al-Ghamdi 6 5 4 6 8 8 12 3 6 6 14 16 14 14
Ahmed Al-Ghamdi 17 17 17 16 17 19 19 16 16 17 4 1 3 6
Table 9: Orderings according to individual measures
KPP-Negative KPP-Positive
Al-Shehhi Al-Shehhi
Jarrah Al-Shehri
N. Al-Hazmi Hanjour
H. Al-Ghamdi H. Al-Ghamdi
Table 10: Results of the key player algorithm
Remark 2. Note that in Table 9 the ordering of the last four columns is approximately reversed
to the ordering of the rest, as power is conceptually inverse to resistance, and then the corre-
lations are usually negative. Moreover, in Table 7 there are some resistances for S(10) (respec-
tively betweenness) that are infinite (resp. zero), so in Table 9 the ordinal numbers 14-19 (resp.
1-6) are interchangeable.
7 Conclusions
This paper proposed a measure for a group’s ability to trigger collective action and discussed
the differences to other (centrality) measures. The Wolfe Primate Data and the data of the 11S
hijackers’ network illustrated how this measure comes to more detailed and different conclu-
sions than those discussed in the literature on Graph Theory. The setup of our model is flexible
to modifications when required by context and data. For example, in the context of revolutions
the interest is typically the expected time it takes until the majority of agents takes action. Also
in other contexts, as innovations, one might wonder about the most influential group in order
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to overturn a certain percentage q of the society. Next, it would be interesting to improve the
greedy heuristic used to find a powerful group, by means of an in-and-out procedure (as in
Borgatti’s key-player algorithm), a careful selection of the initial group, or taking account of
the concept of the efficiency (see Everett and Borgatti, 1999). In this sense, it would also be de-
sirable to find conditions which assure resistance’s supermodularity, i.e., decreasing marginal
effects, which are very important for a social planner who uses this analysis with respect for
example disease prevention. Moreover, a controlled random selection of the initial nodes could
allow to define a centralization measure. Finally, we intend to explore the consequences of in-
tegrating closely related nodes in a certain cluster, and relating the outcomes before and after
this operation. In some sense, the latter could also be interpreted in the framework of network
exposure as an exotic, but useful, way of defining the weight matrix.
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